The idea of the summum bonum as a normative moral theory has been popular ‘from the dawn of philosophy’.[1] If one can substantiate the claims made in the theory it becomes a vital tool which people can use on a daily basis to answer moral issues and disputes. Utilitarianism is a form of a consequentialist moral theory and, therefore, to understand it, it is important to first look at the structure of consequentialism. Consequentialism posits that the moral value of an action is found within the resulting consequences of the action and not intrinsic within the action. Consequentialism is also based on the positing of an intrinsic value, or good. This is a good which is an end goal in itself and so does not lead on to something better. It is also a requirement that what is given as the intrinsic good is measurable. It must be of the same kind and which can be assessed by quantity in different contexts; it must be homogenous.[2] Right actions according to consequentialism are so in as much as they maximise whatever the system regards as intrinsically valuable.[3] Utilitarianism is eudaimonistic consequentialism, where the intrinsic value is suggested to be happiness. There is hedonic utilitarianism, put forward by moral theorists, such as Bentham and Mill, where happiness is equated to pleasure. Preference utilitarianism, put forward by R. M. Hare, is the theory that happiness is the satisfaction of preferences and desires.
This essay will explore the utilitarian argument of J. S. Mill; his views on happiness and what this concept entails. There are many features of a utilitarian account of morals and the scope of this essay does not allow for the discussion of all of them. Two of the most important features of Mill’s argument will be discussed here in depth. Firstly, the argument set out by Mill is dependent upon the soundness of the premise that happiness is a quantifiable concept and if this is not the case then the argument will lose its original appeal. Secondly, one of the main stumbling blocks to the argument seems to be the idea of justice and rights. This criticism and Mill’s explanation of how the two ideas are to be understood in relation to one another will be discussed.
Mill’s version of utilitarianism has primarily been seen as classical hedonic utilitarianism, although there have been some, such as Henry Sidgwick, who believe that there are anti-hedonistic doctrines within the argument.[4] Mill claimed that the end goal or theory of life, and therefore, the intrinsic value is happiness; defined as ‘…not something contradistinguished from pleasure, but pleasure itself, together with the exemption of pain’.[5] That it is intrinsic means that pleasure, and freedom from pain are ‘the only things desirable as ends and… all desirable things…are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as a means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain’.[6] This is not to say that the only good in life is pleasure; for health and liberty are goods also. Mill, however, would argue that they are good because they promote pleasure and are manifestations of pleasure not because they are ends in themselves. The ultimate ends of desires have a pleasure component, and are therefore a part of happiness and it was this which Mill viewed as being the measurable intrinsic value. Mill argued that it was this pleasure component which made all objects desirable as ends, and therefore the assessment of good and bad consequences.[7] As noted happiness must be homogenous for the argument to be conclusive, for if pleasure cannot be compared across different contexts then there would be no way of determining which consequences would be better than others. As P. Byrne notes happiness seems, at least superficially, to be an identifiable and quantifiable good, which can be used to assess the rightness or wrongness of the consequences of acts. This could be a linguistic deficiency within our language, failing to properly distinguish the differences between what is implied by one use of the word pleasure and another. Many people contest that pleasure is quantifiable on the grounds that the specific nature or feeling of pleasure is difficult to pin point. Two different activities, such as playing a game of football and reading poetry, can be classed as pleasurable but are so in very different ways. It is hard to identify and isolate in each situation a specific feeling of pleasure necessary to assess which has more or less pleasure.[8] Mill was aware of this difficulty and answered by suggesting that the only way to compare two pleasures is by the unbiased preference of those who have experienced both.[9] This seems a very elusive way of measuring pleasure, as everybody is different and they perceive emotions and feelings, including pleasure, in different ways. As Fred Feldman noted there have been many proposed answers to the problem of the heterogeneity of pleasure by different distinguished philosophers, such as Moore and Sidgwick, however they have all been found to be lacking to some extent in solving the problem.[10]
Mill believed that ultimate ends, such as a good, could not be proved in the ordinary sense, by reasoning.[11] He argued that the only evidence that it is possible to produce to demonstrate that things are desirable, is that people desire them.[12] The proof that happiness is a good is that people desire their own happiness. He concluded that this is the standard by which moral issues should be judged. Actions, so far as they promote this happiness, are right and actions, so far as they are detrimental to this happiness, are wrong. People should act to increase the general happiness in the aggregate of all people. What Mill’s argument does not do is discuss which people, in the aggregate of all people, are to receive what amount of pleasure. Most would argue that it is not just an increase in general happiness which is important but the appropriate distribution of it as well.[13]
Interestingly, Mill recorded in his autobiography a crisis in relation to his own theory. There were two main problems; Mill was struggling to find his own happiness in the greatest happiness principle and he was uncertain about the utilitarian view of happiness. He was frustrated with the latter on the grounds that happiness could be expressed as a calculus which was arrived at rationally and analytically. It was this continual assessment of things in such a systematic and rational way which he believed to be the cause of the death of his more spontaneous artistic and creative side to his character. Although after this crisis he still maintained that the ‘test of all rules of conduct, and the end of life’ was happiness, he now argued that happiness should be regarded as a consequence of other ends not as the conscious end towards which people should aim.[14] According to Mill ‘the internal culture of the individual’ was a part of happiness which utilitarianism had neglected and this realisation encouraged him to rethink the utilitarian idea with a more symbiotic importance of the intellectual culture (of analysis) and internal culture of the individual.
Turning now to the second feature that will be discussed, Mill deliberated in some depth the concept of justice, trying to show that the ideas of it and utilitarianism are not mutually exclusive. There are at least two notions, used as criticisms, which can be placed under the category of justice. The first is that utilitarian seems to hold that it is permissible to do evil that good may come of it. There are many cases where people would agree that doing evil that good may come of it would be wrong. Whether this feeling is innate or whether it comes from external pressures is debated. A good example of doing evil that good may come of it is given by van den Beld. ‘...doctors in a hospital have five patients, each in need of a different organ for a life saving transplant operation. They also have a healthy, about to be discharged, patient whose separate organs happen to be ideally suited for transplant into these five, dying individuals’.[15] From a utilitarian point of view it would seem to produce the greatest amount of good for the greatest amount of people if the healthy person was forced to become a donor of his organs to save the lives of the other patients. Even if it is noted that the utilitarian way of thinking is based on a principle of benevolence rather than altruism and that ‘one person’s happiness [is] supposed equal in degree [and] is counted for exactly as much as another’s’,[16] the problem is not solved, for the happiness of the donor is less than the combined happiness of the five patients who will survive having had the operation. To most people this ruling would seem appalling as it denies the choice to the right of life for the healthy person forced to donate his organs. A utilitarian counter to this could be to argue that it would destroy the institution of hospital within society, leading to a larger loss of utility than it would to let the five patients die without the operation. This argument can be seen in the writings of Mill, where he proposed that duties of justice must be adhered to stringently so that ‘any conduct which threatens the security of the society generally, is threatening to his own, and calls forth his instinct of self defence’ is punished.[17]
The second notion is the forfeiting of the right which Williams calls integrity. This is closely linked to the idea of unlimited or negative responsibility. To what extent are we to be held responsible for other people’s actions and to what extent are we responsible for failing to stop others from doing wrong? B. Williams noted that this deficiency of negative responsibility was inherent within the principle of consequentialism, and therefore, utilitarianism and the inability of it to coherently distinguish between one person’s projects and another’s meant the forfeiting of a person’s integrity.[18] As John Rawls noted it fails to distinguish between one person and another.[19] As a utilitarian calculates the possible consequence of each action he takes into account his own substantial projects and commitments but does so only as an equal part of other consequences. A result of this is that where a calculation requires him to put aside a life-long project which he is committed to he risks becoming no more than a ‘channel between the input of everyone’s projects, including his own, and an output of optimific decision’.[20]
The similarity between these two instances is that they are both concerned with a person’s right. The difference between rules of justice and other moral rules is that the concept of justice includes, not only that it is right to perform an act and wrong not to but that there are assignable individuals who have the right to the performance of the act.[21] This is a right, according to Mill, that we wish society to protect and where the protection of this right furthers the general happiness and interests of society it becomes a moral duty.[22] Many philosophers, however, do not believe that it is possible to adhere to a notion of a right within the utilitarian framework. The existence of a right is classically seen as an intrinsic moral imperative which overrides other moral considerations; however, from a utilitarian perspective the existence of a right would be based on the consequences of a particular situation. If rights were established then it would seem that where they contradict with the greater good, they should be put aside and this seems to be contradictory to the inherent idea of a right.[23] Mill tried to avoid this issue by maintaining that determining rights on the basis of each individual act would generate a great deal of uncertainty and argument and so general rules for conduct, including the observance of rights and obligations, to which they must yield regardless of the greater good in that situation, must be posited.[24] His thinking was that these rights help to provide a secure society and therefore a defence of these rights, known as justice is concerned with ‘the essentials of human well-being… and are therefore of more absolute obligation than any other rules for the guidance of life…It is their observance which alone preserves peace among human beings’.[25]
As we have seen Mill proposed that the intrinsic good to which all action should be an end is happiness. He believed that this was a homogenous, measurable intrinsic value and could be used to assess different situations. It has been noted, however, that the specific nature of pleasure is hard to define and owing to the variety of different situations which we refer to as pleasurable the heterogeneity of happiness is apparent. The way that Mill contends we should measure pleasure is if a person has experienced those being compared and has an unbiased preference for one over another. The problem with this is that whereas one person may prefer to read rather than watch television, another may prefer the opposite. That this main premise of the argument is not sound leads the argument to fail. If you cannot measure how much pleasure exists in one consequence in comparison to another it will be virtually impossible to assess which course of action will produce the greater good and this is the point of the theory. It is this problematic conception of happiness which has led philosophers, such as R. M. Hare, to restate the utilitarian principle in a preference framework, believing that preferences are quantifiable where happiness is not. It is not just the heterogeneity of happiness which causes a problem but also the distribution of the happiness produced, for this is tied up with the concept of using people as a means to an end, which seems perfectly viable from a utilitarian perspective.
Utilitarianism is thought to be in direct contradiction to a theory of rights. There are many situations in which the attainment of the greatest good would require the neglecting of rights. Doing evil that good may come of it often bypasses the rights, and the happiness, of a few to satisfy the goal of obtaining the greatest amount of happiness for the largest amount of people. The risk of losing the concept of integrity is also apparent with the positing of a utilitarian account of morals for the theory does not seem able to distinguish between one person and another and does not seem able to escape the idea of negative responsibility. One of the underlying problems with the argument is that it seems to be in contradiction to our everyday morality which some would recognise as our conscience. Utilitarians will try to redeem the theory, at this point, by explaining that the neglecting of a person’s rights will ultimately lead to the failing of certain institutions within society and that in turn this would lead to a greater loss of utility. This defence of utilitarianism seems only to highlight the need for special pleading to make the theory acceptable.
Bibliography:
Byrne, P. (1999), The Philosophical and Theological Foundations of Ethics (2nd ed),
Feldman, F. (1997), Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert,
Lyons, D. (1997), Mill’s Utilitarianism: Critical Essays, D. Lyons (ed.), Maryland USA: Rowman and Littlefield.
Mill, J. S. (1901), Utilitarianism,
Smart, J. C. & Williams, B. (1973), Utilitarianism: For and Against,
Sumner, L. (1981), Abortion and Moral Theory,
Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, http://www.rep.routledge.com/welcome?authstatuscode=202
[1] Mill, 1901, p. 1.
[2] Byrne, 1999, p. 64.
[3] Williams, 1973, p.85.
[4] D. Brink, edited by D. Lyons, 1997, p. 149.
[5] Mill, supra 1, p. 8.
[6] Ibid, p. 10.
[7] H. West, edited by D. Lyons, 1997, pp. 90-91.
[8] Byrne, supra 2, pp. 72-73.
[9] H. West, supra 7, pp. 95.
[10] Feldman, 1997, p. 91.
[11] Mill, supra 1, p. 52.
[12] Supra 1, pp. 52-53.
[13] Routledge: Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Utilitarianism, 5) Problems for Utilitarianism.
[14] Mill, 1859, p. 15.
[15] Byrne, supra 2, p. 76.
[16] Mill, supra 1, p. 93.
[17] Mill, supra 1, p. 77.
[18] Smart and Williams, 1973, p95, p.117.
[19] Feldman, 1997, p. 154.
[20] Smart and Williams, supra 18, p. 116.
[21]
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