Natural Evil and Moral Evil
On the 26th December 2004, an earthquake was recorded off the western coast of
On the 11th September 2001, hijackers deliberately crashed two aeroplanes into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in
The following piece will inspect the logical and evidential forms of the problem of evil by expounding the arguments of various scholars who have attempted to respond to each form of the problem. It will seek to explain the views of scholars who think that both natural and moral evil are compatible with the existence of God. I will conclude that the evidential problem of evil poses more of a threat to theism, for the answers that have been offered to it by scholars stand on shaky ground.
The Logical Problem of Evil
In its logical form the problem of evil states that there is a rational inconsistency between fundamental theistic4 beliefs about God and the existence of evil in the world. Mackie formulates the argument as follows:
Premise 1: If God exists and is omni-benevolent,5 then he will prevent as much evil as he is able
Premise 2: If God is omnipotent and omniscient, then he is able to prevent any evil from occurring6
Premise 3: Evil exists
Conclusion: Therefore, God does not exist 7
Mackie notes that although this does not contain any explicit contradiction, the addition of the plausible premises, ‘that good is opposed to evil in such a way that a being who is wholly good eliminates evil as far as he can’ and ‘that there are no limits to what an omnipotent god can do’ renders theistic belief and the existence of evil incompatible.8
Although Mackie’s argument is valid, some scholars have argued that it is not sound. If so, the argument will no longer pose a threat to the rationality of theistic beliefs. Plantinga, for instance, uses a freewill defence to show that the second premise might not obtain. He argues that premise 2 above does not take into account that there may be some goods, such as human freewill, which an omni-benevolent, omnipotent God cannot realise whilst simultaneously guaranteeing that the outcome of this good will never produce evil.9
To support this assertion Plantinga asks us to consider two hypothetical worlds: W and W1. In W a person called Curley is offered a bribe and takes it, whereas in W1 Curley is offered a bribe and rejects it. The actualisation of one of these worlds automatically renders the simultaneous actualisation of the other world logically impossible. Therefore, if W1 obtains and Curley rejects the bribe, then it would not be possible, even for God, to actualise W and vice versa.10 If Curley is significantly free to accept or reject the bribe, then God cannot actualise W1 over W (or W over W1), because to do so would be to determine Curley’s choice.11 Further, Platinga proposes that Curley suffers from transworld depravity, which means that, in every actualisable world in which Curley has free will, Curley will go wrong at least once.
Mackie’s response to this was to say that (taking the above to be true) ‘whatever persons God creates, he had better not create Curley’.12 This expresses beautifully the sentiment behind Mackie’s further proposal that, when creating free men, God should create only those persons who would always freely choose what is right. Such restrictive creation would produce a world in which there would be an abundance of moral good but a complete absence of moral evil. In short, a world far better than the one we in fact witness.
Plantinga, in turn, countered that it is logically possible that all persons whom God could create may suffer from transworld depravity.13 If this is indeed logically possible, this guarantees that it is similarly logically possible that God could not have restricted his creation in such a way as to produce a world containing moral good without moral evil. It can be argued then that the logical problem of evil is, although valid, not a sound argument.14 Plantinga’s freewill defence thus explains why evil exists in the world by attributing it to the misuse of the freewill given to human beings by God.
However, though this argument may offer an explanation of moral evil (such as the twin towers), it is hard to see how natural evils (such as the tsunami), can be accounted for in these terms; natural evils do not appear to result from the misuse of human freewill, yet they appear similarly inconsistent with fundamental theistic beliefs.
In a way analogous to the account of moral evil given above, the theist might explain away natural evil by showing that it is also logically possible that such evil cannot be prevented by God. Plantinga expands the freewill defence in order to do just that - he argues that natural evils may be the result of the misuse of freewill by other beings, namely angels.15 The same argument about transworld depravity can then be applied, and the logical possibility of a world in which God can prevent neither natural nor moral evil is demonstrated.
The logical problem of evil, therefore, does not seem to pose a serious threat to the rationality of theistic belief. Having said this, the response to the problem will seem somewhat unsatisfactory unless it can be accompanied by an explanation about why God permits the amount and quality of evil that exists in the world. Delving into what kind of an explanation might suffice is beyond the scope of this essay.
The Evidential Problem of Evil
Atheists, such as Rowe, have posed the problem of evil in a different form, known as the evidential argument from evil. Rowe admits that the argument does not provide proof of the non-existence of God, but insists that it provides strong evidence for drawing such a conclusion.16 It can be related as follows:
Premise 1: ‘There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse’
Premise 2: ‘An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse’
Conclusion: An omnipotent, omniscient, omni-benevolent being does not exist 17
Rowe notes that premise 2 is consistent with our basic moral principles, and therefore, is the view to which most theists and atheists subscribe. To fault the argument then, the first premise must be shown to be inaccurate18 i.e. that there are no instances of intense suffering which God could have prevented without thereby losing a greater good. This is what Swinburne and Hick attempt to do with their speculative theodicies (the advancement of a plausible rationale for God’s permitting the existence of evil).19
Hick and Swinburne both argue that there is a ‘greater good’ which would be lost if all suffering was eliminated by God. They argue that this ‘greater good’, is moral/spiritual growth and development, and they thus want to include evil and suffering as part of God’s providence.20 This would mean that what appear to be dysteleological21 sufferings are in fact not dysteleological at all because they provide the necessary ‘good states’ which allow and encourage people to become deeper and richer in character.22 According to these scholars, if pain and suffering did not exist in our world then there would be no greater goods, such as sympathy, compassion, concern and aid. Both theodicies include natural evils as well as moral evils as part of God’s providential ‘soul-making’ and character development.
Hick’s theodicy is of the Irenaean type, which purports that the world never ‘fell’ from perfection but that the world has been made in such a way, by God, to encourage humans to develop morally and to discover freely a loving relationship with him.23 On the other hand, Swinburne’s theodicy proposes that humans can only have significant free choice if they have knowledge of how their acts bring about good and evil states, and this knowledge is obtained by induction from past experience. For Swinburne, natural evils are unavoidable by-products of the orderly functioning of the natural laws of the universe. It is imperative for these laws to exist and for them to operate regularly, so that humans will be confident enough about the effects of their actions in order to choose effectively between good and evil.24 Swinburne argues that if humans did not know that rabies was the cause of a horrible death then they would be unable to prevent the disease by quarantining all animals entering the country. He would perhaps argue, in the same way, that if the tsunami had not taken place then we would not have the opportunity to realise the dangers of living in coastal areas prone to tsunamis. In this manner, both Swinburne and Hick try to explain away apparent dysteleological suffering by advocating the notion that the victims will be ‘compensated’ in the afterlife, and that the experiences of this world will pale into insignificance with the ‘exultant and blissful happiness’ of heaven.25
It seems to me that these theodicies fail to show that all sufferings and evils have an aim, or that they form part of God’s moral economy. With reference to the tsunami, Swinburne’s theodicy is infuriatingly circular in that he argues that the ‘greater good’ obtained by the tsunami is the knowledge acquired from it. This helps humans to avoid such natural evils. If God prevented all tsunamis, however, then the knowledge of how to avoid them would become unnecessary.26 Also, with over 228,600 fatalities due to the tsunami, the evil and suffering experienced seems too severe to promote character development: these souls, at least, contrary to developing were instead destroyed.27
Both Hick and Swinburne indicate that there exist ‘victims of the system’, whose sufferings provide others with the opportunity for growth towards being better people and discovering a loving relationship with God.28 This seems somewhat utilitarian in character - where the loss of some people (and hence the evil of that loss) is justified by the total goodness being higher than it would otherwise have been. Theoretically it is possible to see how this view might be adopted, however, in reality, and when faced with day-to-day instances of suffering it may be hard to maintain. It is difficult to imagine philosophers, such as Hick and Swinburne, coming face-to face with living victims of the tsunami who have lost everything they own, their livelihood and above all their families and loved ones and explaining to them that their suffering and the deaths of their loved ones is good as it allows, for example, people in England to ‘have the opportunity to be of use’.29 Those who are suffering and those who have died are, accordingly, ‘privileged to be the vehicle who presents the one who can help with the opportunity to help’ because they ‘make the life of the helper matter’.30
Perhaps the most persuasive criticism made against speculative theodicies is not epistemological in nature, but a moral critique.31 One might argue that there exists a link between the rationalisation, justification and understanding of evil and suffering as part of God’s providential plan and an unspoken, but implicit, tolerance and, therefore, acceptance of the evils which exist.32 As Dostoyevsky argued through the mouthpiece of Ivan Karamazov, even the asking of questions about how to understand and explain suffering should be seen as morally corrupt, for such answers, or theodicies, are attempts to make the incomprehensible comprehensible by altering the facts of such suffering.33
For example, someone might alter the facts by using certain methodologies in philosophy, e.g. using such language and style as to portray ‘maximum dispassion…and uninvolved survey’ which leaves us in danger of trivialising and failing to adequately capture the suffering it is trying to describe.34 This is because it can be argued, and in my opinion very convincingly, that an important element of any suffering, is the response to it that is given by the sufferer. Emotion is therefore a constitutive aspect of suffering, and the upshot of removing this element from any instance, would be to change the essence of that particular instance in toto. It follows from this that the philosopher, if he employed dispassionate language, would be discussing a case quite different to the one initially indicated.35 Improper use of language in discussions of suffering will invariably affect the arguments that are being proposed by philosophers.
Another way theodicies alter the facts is by assuming that they can keep the theoretical philosophical activity of theodicising separate from the moral struggle that one must make when faced with the concrete evils of life. Theodicy demands a change in the emotional world view of the one reading it – a change in the reader’s ‘sensibilities’. In other words, the problem is this: Even if all the suffering in the world could be theoretically understood in terms of the greater good (as in the theodicy given above), and you could rationalise the necessity of evil in your mind, could you spiritually accept a God who asks for the suffering of, say, just one child? In the words of Ivan Karamazov: ’Why should they [children], too, be used as dung for someone’s future harmony? I understand of course, what a cataclysm of the universe it will be when everything in heaven and on earth blends in one hymn of praise…[t]hen, indeed, the mother will embrace the torturer who had her child torn to pieces by his dogs, and all three will cry aloud “thou art just, O Lord!” …But there’s the rub: for it is that I cannot accept….and that is why I renounce higher harmony altogether’.36 Hick and Swinburne do not seem to even discuss this as an issue when theodicising let alone try to attempt to persuade the emotion as separate from the intellect.37
Without the persuasion, by the theodicist, of the reader to alter the emotional outlook they have on a particular suffering the theodicist can really only expound a theodicy for his own benefit and for those who have similar world views to him. It will not, however, be of much use as a defence against those who pose the evidential problem as argument against God’s existence.38
Conclusion
The logical problem of evil, if shown to be sound, would give a ‘neat and clear demonstration of the incompatibility of God and evil’, however Plantinga has argued effectively that this is not the case.39 The evidential argument poses more of a threat to theism, purporting that owing to the quantity and quality of evil observed in the world it is irrational to believe in the existence of a ‘theistic’ God. Swinburne and Hick are amongst others in attempting to defend belief in God by using speculative theodicies, however, theists and non-theists alike have become increasingly uneasy with the legitimacy of such replies – and this is largely owing to the moral critique made of theodicising. It is important to bear in mind, however, that although there does not seem to be a satisfactory answer to the evidential problem of evil it does not mean that there isn’t an answer to be found. This idea, termed the ‘Noseeum Premiss’ will, no doubt, be one which many theists will fall back on.
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004_Indian_Ocean_Earthquake, 08-02-05
[2] Swinburne, in Peterson 1992, p. 303
[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_11%2C_2001_attacks
[4] For the purposes of this piece a ‘narrow’ distinction of theism will be adopted: a ‘narrow’ theist is someone who believes in the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, omni-benevolent being who created the world (Rowe, in Lane Craig, 2002, p317).
[5] To be omni-benevolent is to be all-loving, and such a quality would seem to clash with knowingly allowing preventable evil.
[6] Note that this holds because if he is omniscient (all-knowing) then there can be no evil in the world of which he is unaware, and if he is omnipotent (all-powerful), then there can be no evil that it is beyond his power to prevent.
[7] That is, God conceived of in this way. Note that if God were to lose just one of the three qualities attributed to him, his existence would be consistent with the existence of evil e.g. if God were no longer omni-benevolent he would not care about certain evils (though he would be able to prevent them and would know about them), if he were no longer omnipotent then there would be evils beyond his power to prevent (despite his desire to prevent them and knowledge of them), and if he were no longer omniscient then there would be evils of which he had no knowledge (despite his ability and desire to prevent them).
[8] Mackie 1982, p. 150
[9] O’Connor, in Lane Craig 2002, pp. 306-307.
[10] This is true so long as one accepts a definition of omnipotence which excludes an ability to do the logically impossible. The vast majority of scholars accept such limitations without feeling that the power of such a being has been compromised. However, one famous philosopher who appeared to hold that omnipotence did entail an ability to do the logically impossible was Descartes.
[11] Note: to determine Curley’s choice appears to undermine Curley’s ability to freely choose.
[12] Mackie, 1982, p. 174.
[13] Plantinga, 1977, p. 53.
[14] It is important to note that this argument for the consistency of theistic beliefs with the existence of evil does not depend on showing that transworld depravity is the case, or even that it is probable, but only that it is logically possible.
[15] Ibid, p. 58
[16] Rowe, in Adams & Adams 1990, pp. 131-132
[17] Ibid, pp. 127-128
[18] Ibid, p. 129
[19] Wetzel, in Peterson 1992, p. 357
[20] Ibid, p. 357
[21] Where dysteleological can be taken to mean purposeless.
[22] Swinburne 1998, p. 167
[23] Hick 1966, p. 323
[24] Ibid, p. 185
[25] Hick 1966, p. 376
[26] Strump, in Peterson 1992, p. 326
[27] Puccetti, in Peterson 1992, p238
[28] Wetzel, in Peterson 1992, p358
[29] Swinburne, 1998, p167
[30] Ibid, p167
[31] Sutherland 1977, p. 30
[32] Wetzel, in Peterson 1992, p. 353
[33] Sutherland 1977, p. 29
[34]
[35]
[36] Dostoyevsky (1958), The Brothers Karamazov, trans.Magarshack, D Penguin Books Ltd. p. 286.
[37] Wetzel, in Peterson 1992, p. 352
[38] Ibid, p21)
[39] O’Connor, in Lane Craig 2002, p. 309
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Howard-Snyder, D. (1996), The Evidential Argument from Evil, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Lane Craig, W. [ed.] (2002), Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide,
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